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There has been much debate over whether to accept the claim that meaning is 
normative. One obstacle to making progress in that debate is that it is not always clear 
what the claim amounts to. In this paper, I try to resolve a dispute between those who 
advance the claim concerning how it should be understood. More specifically, I 
critically examine two competing conceptions of the normativity of meaning, 
rejecting one and defending the other. Though the paper aims to settle a dispute 
among proponents of the claim that meaning is normative, it should be of interest to 
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What is the Normativity of Meaning?
* 
 
1  Introduction 
‘Meaning is normative.’
1  For some time now, philosophers have been circulating 
slogans like this. It is perhaps Kripke, in his influential (and controversial) reading of 
Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following (1982), who is most responsible for the 
present popularity of such slogans. On behalf of Wittgenstein, or ‘Wittgenstein as his 
thought struck Kripke’, Kripke writes: 
Suppose I do mean addition by ‘+’. What is the relation of this supposition to the 
question how I will respond to the problem ‘65+57’? The dispositionalist gives a 
descriptive account of this relation: if ‘+’ meant addition, then I will answer ‘125’. 
But this is not the proper account of the relation, which is normative, not descriptive. 
The point is not that, if I meant addition by ‘+’, I will answer ‘125’, but that, if I 
intend to accord with my past meaning of ‘+’, then I should answer ‘125’. (1982: 37) 
The general consensus among scholars is that Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein is a 
misreading in almost all respects with one notable exception—the point about the 
‘relation’ of meaning to use being a normative one. Commentators as otherwise 
diverse as Bloor (1997), Brandom (1994), Buleandra (2008), Glendinning (1998), 
Glock (2005), Hacker (2010), Lance and Hawthorne (1997: 180ff), Luntley (2003), 
McCulloch (1995), McDowell (1998), McGinn (1984), Railton (2001), Schroeder 
(2006: 174), Stone (1999), Stroud (2000: 186-187), Thornton (1998), Weiss (2010: 
                                                           
* This paper has been a long time in development and has survived through several changes of mind. 
Thanks to all those whose input helped to shape it, including Maria Alvarez, Jeff Speaks, Indrek 
Reiland, Jussi Suikannen, Jonathan Way, anonymous referees, and audiences at the University of East 
Anglia and Lund University. 
1 I shall focus exclusively upon linguistic meaning, the meanings which expressions possess in a 
language, whether the public language or a person’s idiolect. Some philosophers advance similar 
slogans with respect to mental content. I shall not comment on this issue, though presumably much of 
what follows bears on it.  
  Note that, in the passage below and throughout his discussion, Kripke’s focus shifts between 
what a speaker means in using an expression and what her word means in the language.   3 
81), and Wright (2001) attribute to Wittgenstein the view that meaning is in some 
sense (constitutively, or essentially, or irreducibly, or…) normative.
2 They also 
(without exception) endorse some version of that view, as do numerous other 
philosophers more or less sympathetic to Wittgenstein’s philosophy, including Alston 
(2000), Blackburn (1984), Gibbard (1994), Ginsborg (2012), Haddock (2012), 
Korsgaard (1996: 20), Millar (2004), Morris (1992), Putnam (1991: 11ff), Sellars 
(1962), and, until recently, Boghossian (2008: ch. 1; cp. ch. 4).
3 
  Many of the above take the slogan ‘Meaning is Normative’ to capture 
something important about meaning, something which imposes constraints upon 
adequate accounts of meaning, perhaps something which immediately and in advance 
of the details rules out certain ways of trying to capture or characterise the 
phenomenon altogether, in particular those ways that avail themselves only of the 
explanatory resources available to the natural sciences. Others take the putative 
insight the slogan expresses to have anti-realist or radically sceptical consequences 
(see Kripke 1982; Wright 2001). 
Whatever its pedigree, and however popular and suggestive it might seem, a 
slogan it remains. As Hattiangadi notes, while the phrase is ‘catchy’, ‘it is not always 
clear what it means’ (2007: 37). The aim of this paper is try to get clear about how it 
should be understood. I shall start by outlining the orthodox interpretation of the 
slogan. Having done so, I shall introduce a series of examples of a sort which several 
philosophers claim shows the orthodox interpretation to be unsatisfactory. The same 
philosophers suggest an alternative, unorthodox interpretation of the slogan. I shall 
                                                           
2 Are they right to do so? Regarding the view that what an expression means is determined by what 
causes its use and/or the effects of its use, Wittgenstein remarks, ‘the meaning of a sign is the effect 
which it should have […] but not the effect that it will have’ (2003: 343). 
3 In a similar fashion, Hanfling (2002: 6) and Mulhall (2003) attribute to Wittgenstein, and endorse, the 
view that language or language use is in some sense normative. This is an important theme in the work 
of Cavell, who writes, ‘what is normative is exactly ordinary use itself’ (2002: 21).   4 
examine various ways of trying to spell out that unorthodox interpretation and argue 
that none is satisfactory. Finally, I return to the cases which seemed to cast doubt on 
the orthodox reading and suggest ways in which its proponent can account for them. 
Defending orthodoxy is not a glamorous job, but someone’s got to do it! 
While this paper addresses a debate between proponents of the slogan, its 
results should be of interest to those who are suspicious of it. In order to evaluate 
critically the thought which the slogan expresses, one needs to know what that 
thought is. 
 
2  Orthodoxy 
Call the thesis to which the slogan ‘Meaning is normative’ gestures, Normativism, and 
its advocates, Normativists. Normativists do not think that what an expression means 
has normative import merely in the light of other considerations—say, moral, legal, 
aesthetic, instrumental or prudential—but that meaning is essentially normative. 
Accordingly, one might understand Normativism as the thesis that, from the fact that 
an expression bears a certain meaning, certain normative implications immediately 
follow.
4 
  A widespread route to the orthodox interpretation of Normativism is via the 
observation that, given what an expression means, there are correct and incorrect 
ways of using it (see Blackburn 1984: 281; Boghossian 2008: 15; McDowell 2009: 
essay 11). For example, the following appears trivial (where S names a subject): 
(CORRECT)  For any S, x: if ‘red’ means red, it is correct for S to 
apply ‘red’ to x if and only if x is red. 
                                                           
4 Glüer and Wikforss (2009) call this ‘meaning-engendered normativity’, as opposed to ‘meaning-
determining normativity’. I shall focus exclusively on the former.   5 
Of course, (CORRECT) concerns only the term ‘red’ but it is straightforward enough to 
see how one could arrive at a generalised version of the principle that holds of other 
terms.
5 
  All parties, even the staunchest critics of Normativism, would agree that 
(CORRECT) is platitudinous. Hattiangadi, for example, states unequivocally that it is 
not ‘open to us to deny that in order to have meaning, terms must have correctness 
conditions. This is what distinguishes the use of language from the making of mere 
noise’ (2006: 222). The more contentious claim is that one should understand 
                                                           
5 There are concerns one might have about (CORRECT). Since this principle is not what is at issue in the 
debate this paper seeks to contribute to—all parties accept it—I shall relegate to this note a brief 
discussion of some of those concerns. 
One might worry about the ‘disquotational’ character of the specification of the meaning of 
‘red’ embedded in (CORRECT). One way to alleviate this worry might be to imagine a context in which 
a person is under the mistaken impression that ‘red’ as used by a certain person is not the familiar 
English word and, so as to set her straight, she is told that ‘red’ mean red (i.e. really is the familiar 
English word). However, if the worry persists, one could simply choose a different example. Nothing 
in what follows hangs on it. 
Next, note that ‘red’ (in English) is ambiguous—it can mean red or, for example, communist. 
If ‘red’ means communist when I use it on a given occasion, it is not correct for me to apply it to a red 
balloon. (CORRECT), one might think, suggests otherwise. In response, one might appeal to the fact that 
context typically disambiguates an expression. The fact that the conversation concerns our favourite 
colour, say, and not our political allegiances determines that, on this occasion, ‘red’ means red, not 
communist. In view of this, one might reformulate the antecedent of (CORRECT) as follows: If ‘red’ 
means red in the context of utterance….  A different response would be to say that what appears to be 
an ambiguous word is in fact the ‘surface forms of distinct words’ (cf. Segal 2006: 209), namely, ‘red1’, 
meaning red, and ‘red2’, meaning communist, which are unambiguous. In view of this, one might 
reformulate the antecedent of (CORRECT) as follows: If ‘red1’ means red…. For ease of presentation, 
I shall stick to the original formulation. 
  One might instead worry that the idea that there are specifiable general principles like 
(CORRECT) governing the use of expressions is at odds with the thesis of contextualism or occasion-
sensitivity. For critical discussion, see Whiting 2010.  
  Finally, one might instead worry that (CORRECT) concerns only the application of expressions 
(cf. Buleandra 2008). Lying behind this worry might be one of several others. First, there are words 
which cannot be said to apply to things—for example, ‘hello’, ‘in’, and ‘sometimes’—but which 
nonetheless are meaningful and (so) can be employed correctly or incorrectly. However, (CORRECT) is 
entirely consistent with this point—it purports to capture only one respect in which meaningful 
expressions of a certain sort have conditions of correct use.  
Second, there are words which can be said to apply but which can be used correctly or 
incorrectly in ways which do not involving applying them—for example, in exclamations, orders, 
inferences, questions, and so on. However, (CORRECT) purports to capture only one normative 
implication of the fact that ‘red’ means red; it is consistent with it that there are other such implications. 
Finally, one might think that certain kinds of words have the superficial appearance of being 
words which are used to apply to things but in fact are not—a standard example might be ‘good’. Such 
words nonetheless have conditions of correct use. One response to this is to insist that there is no harm 
in saying for certain purposes that such terms are applied to things, any more than there is harm in 
saying that they can be used to state truths, so long as one recognises that what one is doing in 
‘applying’ one kind of word differs from what one is doing in applying another kind of word.   6 
(CORRECT) as capturing a normative implication of the fact that ‘red’ means red, that 
correctness should be understood in this context as a normative notion. 
To bring out the disputed normative reading of (CORRECT), one might 
reformulate it as:
6 
(OUGHT)  For any S, x: if ‘red’ means red, S ought not to (apply ‘red’ to 
x) if and only if x is not red. 
I take (OUGHT) to be equivalent to: 
(MAY)  For any S, x: if ‘red’ means red, S may (apply ‘red’ to x) if and 
only if x is red. 
It is fair to say that Normativism is typically understood along something like these 
lines, as the thesis that (OUGHT) and (MAY) specify truths which follow immediately 
from facts about the condition for the correct use of the relevant expression, in this 
case ‘red’, which in turn is a consequence of its meaning what it does. 
  Evidently, these principles are to be understood as expressing pro tanto 
judgements. If applying a word which means red to a blue object is the only way to 
save one’s children’s lives, one should do so! What (OUGHT) claims is that, given 
only the fact that ‘red’ means red, one ought not to apply it to something which is 
blue, which is consistent with the possibility that, given all the facts, one may apply 
‘red’ to something which is blue. 
Importantly, on the version of Normativism just introduced, the relevant kind 
of norm which is supposed to hold in light of what an expression means is a norm of 
truth.
7 To appreciate this, note that (OUGHT) is equivalent to: 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Alternatively, one could simply restrict (CORRECT) to those expressions which can be said to apply and 
tell another story about other kinds of expressions.  
6 The brackets here indicate the scope of ‘ought’. 
7 Alternatively, one might view ‘correct’ as expressing a notion like epistemic justification. For critical 
discussion, see Whiting 2009b.   7 
(TRUE)  For any S, x: if ‘red’ means red, S ought not to (apply ‘red’ to 
x) if and only if it is not true that x is red. 
Correct application coincides with true application.  One upshot of characterising 
Normativism in this way is to treat it as one with the thesis that there is a norm 
governing assertion, specifically, a norm of truth. On such a view, facts like the 
following hold quite generally:
8 
(ASSERT)  For any S, x: S ought not to (assert that x is red) if and only if it 
is not true that x is red. 
The link between (OUGHT) and (ASSERT) is not immediate, since (ASSERT) does not 
mention applying an expression bearing a particular meaning. Nonetheless, it is 
straightforward enough to forge a link once one recalls that, by applying an 
expression that means red to an object, one is asserting of that object that it is red
9 
and, conversely, that asserting that an object is red requires applying a word that 
means red to it. 
  Treating the claim that meaning is normative as one with the claim that 
assertion is normative is widespread among Normativists. Consider the following 
remarks by Thornton: 
Linguistic meaning has a normative dimension in that words can be used correctly or 
incorrectly. For any particular use of a word that has a meaning, it can be asked 
whether it has been used correctly or not. It can be asked whether it has been used in 
accordance with its meaning. 
                                                           
8 Whether or not truth provides the normative standard for assertion is a contentious issue, exploring 
which is beyond the scope of this paper. For present purposes, I shall take (ASSERT) for granted and 
consider its implications for the debate concerning Normativism. Note that if—to consider the most 
prominent position in the recent literature—assertion is subject to a norm of knowledge (see 
Williamson 2000: ch. 11), this would generate a subsidiary norm of truth. For discussion and defence 
of (ASSERT), see Whiting 2013. 
9 Could one apply ‘red’ to an object without asserting that it is red, say, when supposing that it is red? I 
think it is more accurate to say that, when formulating a supposition, one is not applying the relevant 
expression but as if applying it, that is, supposing that it applies. Nothing hangs on this in what follows.   8 
In spelling out this point, Thornton informs us that the relevant normative relation 
concerns ‘the connection between an assertion […] and the state of affairs that 
determines whether it is true or false’, which in turn raises the question, ‘How does a 
judgement normatively prescribe or determine some state of affairs?’ (1988: 32-33) 
  In a similar fashion, Brandom begins by stating, ‘Meanings are invoked to 
explain how it is correct or appropriate to use words and sentences, how one ought to 
deploy them’. Immediately afterwards, Brandom tells us that the relevant ‘linguistic 
propriety’ governing an expression concerns ‘when its assertional use is appropriate 
or allowable, when a speaker is licensed or entitled to use the sentence to perform that 
speech act’ (2000: 185-6). McDowell also introduces the Normativist thought that 
‘the very idea’ of meaning is ‘fraught with “ought”’. In cashing out this pregnant 
remark, McDowell explains that it reflects the fact that we understand an expression’s 
meaning as ‘determining the conditions under which whole sentences are correctly or 
incorrectly asserted’ (2009: 59-61). 
  Clearly, then, a widespread way of interpreting Normativism, motivated in 
part by the platitude that meaningful expressions have conditions of correct 
application, is as committed to the claim that facts about what expressions mean entail 
facts about how they should or may be applied, which in turn is understood as 
tantamount to the claim that there are facts about when subjects should or may 
perform speech acts of asserting, according to whether or not what would thereby be 
asserted is true. 
Many challenge the view that there is a norm of truth of the sort captured by a 
generalised version of (OUGHT), one which can be seen to govern the use of 
meaningful language independently of, say, moral or instrumental considerations, and 
to the suggestion that the platitudinous status of (CORRECT) provides any support for   9 
such a view (see, e.g., Hattiangadi 2007). I have tried to meet these challenges 
elsewhere and they are not my present concern.
10 Rather, I shall address a challenge to 
the slogan, understood in the orthodox fashion, which comes from within the 
Normativist camp.  
   
3  An unorthodox view 
I have outlined the orthodox interpretation of Normativism, according to which the 
fact that an expression has a certain meaning implies that there are standards for its 
correct and incorrect application, and so for how it should or may be used in assertion, 
where correctness and incorrectness coincide with truth and falsity respectively. A 
minority of Normativists reject this as a satisfactory interpretation of the thought to 
which the slogan ‘Meaning is normative’ points and suggest an alternative, including 
Millar (2004: ch. 6), Glock (2005), McGinn (1984), and Schroeder (2008).
11 Another 
name to add to the list is Moore who, in reporting Wittgenstein’s lectures, advances 
the following line of thought: 
From the fact that you are using language correctly, in the sense of ‘in accordance 
with an established  rule’, it by no means follows that what you assert, by this correct 
use of language, is ‘correct’ in the very different sense in which ‘This is correct’ = 
‘This is true’, nor from the fact that you are using language incorrectly that what you 
assert by this incorrect use is ‘incorrect’ in the very different sense in which ‘That is 
incorrect’ = ‘That is false’. (1954: 308-309) 
With Moore, proponents of the unorthodox interpretation of the slogan ‘Meaning is 
normative’ draw a distinction between what one might call semantic 
correctness/incorrectness and factual correctness/incorrectness. As Glock puts it, ‘one 
                                                           
10 For an overview of such objections and attempts to meet them, see Whiting 2009a. For a recent and 
interesting objection which, to my knowledge, has yet to receive critical attention, see Speaks 2009.    10 
can apply a word in a way which is semantically correct, without applying it correctly 
in the sense of applying it to say something true’, and vice versa (2005: 229).
12 
Truly or falsely applying an expression—and so correctly or incorrectly 
asserting—is one thing, using a term in a way which is semantically correct—in 
keeping with its meaning—is quite another. Correctly using an expression in the one 
sense can diverge from correctly using it in the other sense. The proponents of the 
orthodox reading allegedly overlook this distinction and so conflate the two sorts of 
correctness. 
  To appreciate this, consider examples of the sort Glock (2005), Millar (2004), 
and Schroeder (2008) discuss. Suppose that Mike applies ‘vixen’ to a female fox, 
taking the creature to be a male cat. It appears that Mike makes a true statement—
truly applies ‘vixen’—and so makes no factual error. However, there appears to be a 
semantic error—Mike’s use of ‘vixen’ seems not to accord with its meaning. He uses 
it as if it means something other than it does, as if it applies to a creature on the basis 
of its being a male cat. 
Suppose now that Sophie applies ‘vixen’ to a female fox, and does so thinking 
that the creature is a female fox. It seems that Sophie makes a true statement—truly 
applies ‘vixen’—and so makes no factual error. Moreover, there appears to be no 
                                                                                                                                                                      
11 See also Buleandra 2008; Miller Forthcoming. I should add that Schroeder is officially exploring, not 
endorsing, an alternative conception of semantic normativity.  
12 I shall focus in what follows on one influential unorthodox account of the normativity of meaning; 
there are others, which I do not have space to discuss here. According to Ginsborg (2011; 2012), for 
example, the normativity of meaning concerns a subject’s using an expression in ‘awareness that what 
she is doing is appropriate’, where being appropriate is a matter neither of how she ought, in the 
reasons-implying sense, to use the expression nor of how it correctly, in the sense of truly, applies (cf. 
2012: 138). For a critical discussion of Ginsborg’s view, see Haddock 2012. 
  One finds further unorthodox accounts in the work of Gampel (1997) and Verheggen (2011). 
Although they differ in the details of their views and in what they take the consequences of those views 
to be, both argue that meaning is ‘essentially’ normative and at the same time insist that the normativity 
in question is, in Gampel’s words, ‘only hypothetical, not categorical, depending for its force on the 
aims of the agent and on other normative pressures’ (2012: 228). Exploring views of this sort is the task 
for another occasion.   11 
semantic error—Sophie’s use of ‘vixen’ accords with its meaning what it does in a 
way that Mike’s does not. 
  Suppose finally that Bekki applies ‘vixen’ to a male cat. Nonetheless, Bekki 
takes the creature to be a female fox. It appears that Bekki makes a false statement—
falsely applies ‘vixen’—and so makes a factual mistake. However, there appears to be 
no semantic error—Bekki’s use of ‘vixen’, like Sophie’s, accords with its meaning 
what it does. 
These examples (appear) to point to a distinction between using an expression 
correctly by truly applying it and using it correctly by according with its meaning, and 
so to a distinction between the normative considerations that obtain as a result of the 
fact that one is performing the speech act of assertion and those that obtain given only 
what one’s words mean. The unorthodox Normativists complain that the orthodox 
overlook this distinction. 
It is worth stressing at this point that the unorthodox Normativists are not 
merely complaining that there is more to the normativity of meaning than (CORRECT) 
and its kin express, that those principles capture only some of the normative 
considerations which hold in light of the fact that an expression bears a certain 
meaning (cf. n5 above); rather, they claim that what the orthodox present as the 
normativity of meaning is in fact no such thing; at best, it captures the normativity of 
assertion. 
While the idea that there is a distinction between factual and semantic 
correctness has some intuitive appeal, the difficulty is how to articulate that 
distinction, in particular, how to spell out the notion of according with meaning. 
 
4  According with meaning    12 
Consider first the following characterisation of semantic correctness by McGinn. 
Correctness in the sense of according with an expression’s meaning is ‘a matter of 
meaning now what one meant earlier’ (1984: 174). This suggests a generalised 
version of the following (where ‘t1’ gives a time and ‘t2’ a later time): 
(ACCORD1)  For any S: if S means red by ‘red’ at t1, then S ought to (mean 
red by ‘red’ at t2). 
An initial worry with (ACCORD1) is that, as formulated, it is a principle concerning 
speaker meaning rather than linguistic meaning, which suggests that it will be of little 
use in elucidating a notion of linguistic correctness and will have no immediate 
bearing on theories of linguistic meaning. Setting this aside, another problem is that 
meaning something at a certain time by an expression different than what one meant 
by it on an earlier occasion just does not look like a mistake. As Wikforss puts the 
point, ‘If at t2 I use “horse” with a different meaning than at t1, then I have simply 
changed my intentions and the word has a different meaning’ (2001: 210).  
Furthermore, it is just implausible to suggest that what a subject means by an 
expression on a particular occasion on its own gives her any reason to mean the same 
thing by it on a future occasion. Of course, there might in certain circumstances be 
reasons not to change what one means by one’s words—for the sake of smooth 
communicative exchange perhaps—but such reasons would precisely not be a 
consequence of what those words mean alone. 
  Elsewhere, McGinn characterises semantic incorrectness as a matter of ‘using 
the same word with a different meaning from that originally intended (and doing so in 
ignorance of this change)’ (1984: 147). This suggests another version of 
Normativism, according to which the following principle holds:   13 
(ACCORD2)  For any S: if S intends at t1 to mean red by ‘red’ at t2, then S 
ought to (mean red by ‘red’ at t2). 
Setting aside the fact that (ACCORD2) also concerns speaker meaning, the problem 
with it is that it does not seem to capture a distinctive kind of semantic normativity. 
Granting that (ACCORD2) expresses a truth, the relevant normative statement follows 
from a subject’s having a certain intention; thus, it looks like it expresses a species of 
instrumental normativity, concerning what one should do to fulfil one’s intentions. A 
mistake, on this view, is failing to accord with one’s (prior) intentions, rather than 
failing to accord with meaning. Whether or not there is such a species of normativity, 
that is, whether or not the fact that one has a certain intention has any normative 
import, (ACCORD2) cannot provide Normativists with an articulation of the thesis they 
seek to advance; it might have implications for theories of intention, but not for 
theories of meaning. 
  McGinn might reply that what is incorrect in the distinctively semantic sense 
is going against one’s intentions unwittingly. Perhaps one means blue by ‘red’ at t2 
because one wrongly takes this to satisfy what one intended at t1, namely, to mean 
red by ‘red’ at t2. However, if there is a mistake here, it is a mistake of judgement—
one judges that such-and-such accords with one’s previous intention, when in fact it 
does not. The judgement is incorrect to the extent that it is untrue. This proposal is in 
danger of collapsing into the view that there is a norm according to which true 
judgement is correct and false judgement is incorrect, which the orthodox Normativist 
could accept. 
  All of this suggests that McGinn’s attempts to characterise a distinctive form 
of semantic normativity in terms of what a subject means by an expression on 
different occasions is unsuccessful. As Boghossian insists, though his route to this   14 
conclusion is different from that taken here, the normativity of meaning does not 
concern ‘a relation between meaning something by an expression at one time and 
meaning something by it at some later time’ but rather ‘a relation between meaning 
something by it at some time and its use at that time’ (2008: 15). And, I would add, it 
does not concern what an expression should mean, or what someone should mean by 
it, but how a subject should use an expression given what it does mean. 
Millar tells us that semantic, as opposed to factual, incorrectness results when 
there is a ‘mismatch between what I say when I apply the term, and what I mean to 
say when applying it’. He continues: 
When we make statements we give it to be understood that what we say is true and 
that we said what we meant to say. This dictates that the words we use when we state 
something to be so should be apt to say what we mean to say. (2004: 163; cf. 177)
13 
One might try to capture the thought here, with respect to the use of ‘red’, as follows: 
(ACCORD3)  For any S, x: if S intends to express the thought that x is red, 
then S ought to (apply ‘red’ to x if and only if ‘red’ means red). 
Unfortunately, (ACCORD3) reintroduces a familiar difficulty. It no longer appears that 
what Millar draws attention to is a species of distinctively semantic normativity, since 
the relevant normative statement about what the subject ought to do is a consequence 
of the fact that she intends to express a certain thought, rather than the fact that the 
expression means what it does. Thus, like (ACCORD2), (ACCORD3) concerns a species 
of instrumental normativity. This is not what the Normativist is after. 
Elsewhere, Millar offers a quite different way to characterise a supposedly 
distinctive kind of semantic correctness: 
                                                           
13 Here Millar characterises the relevant normative considerations in terms of how one ‘should’ use 
words; elsewhere, he recommends characterising them in terms of how one is ‘committed’ to using 
words. There is not space to address the issue of whether one should understand the normativity of   15 
A use is correct in the sense of being in keeping with the relevant meaning provided 
that it is not a misuse. It is a misuse when it fails to respect the conditions of correct 
(= true) application of the term. (2004: 165) 
Again, Millar seems not to succeed in articulating the relevant notion of semantically 
correct use. What exactly does it mean, one might ask, to respect the conditions of 
correct application for a term, but to use it in a way that accords with those conditions, 
namely, by correctly (=truly) applying it? That is, what is to respect the conditions of 
correct application if it is not to (try to) satisfy them? Millar has yet to capture a 
notion of ‘correctness of use, conceived as use in keeping with meaning’ that diverge 
from ‘correctness of use, conceived as true application’ (2004: 165). 
Consider now Moore’s comments on the alleged distinction between two 
kinds of correctness:  
It by no means follows, for instance, from the fact that you are using the word ‘foot’ 
‘correctly’, i.e. for the length for which it is usually used in English, that when you 
make such an assertion as ‘This rod is less than four feet long’, your assertion is true; 
and, if you were to use it ‘incorrectly’ for the length which is properly called in 
English an ‘inch’ or for that which is properly called a ‘yard’, it would by no means 
follow that any assertion you made by this incorrect use of the word ‘foot’ was false. 
(1954: 309) 
A semantic mistake, on this view, is using a word to signify (‘for’) something which 
the word in English (or whatever) does not signify.  
However, if I use a word which in English signifies the colour red to signify or 
speak of the colour blue, it hardly follows that I have made a mistake—perhaps I am 
speaking some variant of English, or have introduced a linguistic innovation, or am 
                                                                                                                                                                      
meaning as a matter of ‘should’s (and ‘ought’s) or of ‘commitment’s (in Millar’s sense), and the issue 
does not bear immediately on the present discussion.   16 
speaking a different language. Of course, if I am intending to speak (‘proper’) 
English, then I am making a mistake insofar as I am failing to execute my intention. 
But any norm which would deliver the verdict that such a mistake has been made 
would, once more, be instrumental. Alternatively, if I judge that ‘red’ (in English) is a 
word for the colour blue, then I am making a mistaken judgement. But this is to return 
to the view which we looked to Moore for an alternative to, according to which ‘This 
is incorrect’ = ‘This is false’. Perhaps there are views according to which there is 
some reason, at least for some people, to speak (‘proper’) English (as opposed to 
some other language); but, whatever that reason is, it is surely not going to be 
provided by nothing more than the fact that the words in English mean what they do.
14 
Despite all the twists and turns, a satisfactory alternative interpretation of the 
slogan, ‘Meaning is normative’, remains outstanding. To be sure, in applying the term 
‘red’, there are things one might do which one should not do other than falsely 
asserting that an object is red, like judging that ‘red’ means blue or acting so as to 
frustrate one’s intention. But the search was for a kind of correctness which diverges 
from factual correctness or for a species of normativity other than instrumental.
15 
  Perhaps the following captures what the proponent of the unorthodox 
conception of the normativity of meaning has in mind: 
                                                           
14 One might wonder why I have yet to consider the appeal to the notion of a practice, which figures 
prominently in Millar’s discussion and which has considerable Wittgensteinian pedigree. Perhaps one 
could use that notion to characterise a way in which the use of an expression might be correct without 
being used to express a truth or incorrect without being used to express a falsehood. Using an 
expression correctly in the relevant sense is using it in a way that accords with practice, while using it 
incorrectly in the relevant sense is using it a way that fails to accord with practice.  
I do not think this gets us very far. What is the practice of using the (English) word ‘red’ if not 
the practice of applying it to red things? One might suggest (following Moore) that the practice is one 
of using the word ‘red’ to signify the colour red, in which case using the word incorrectly, in the 
relevant sense, is using it to signify something other than red. But it is hard to see how a person who 
uses the word ‘red’ for, say, the colour blue can be said to be participating in the practice of using the 
word ‘red’ to signify the colour red at all—indeed, she precisely seems not to be participating in that 
practice. Of course, she might be intending to do so, or she might think that she is, but this raises now 
familiar issues.   17 
(ACCORD4)  For any S, x: if ‘red’ means red, S may (apply ‘red’ to x) if and 
only if S believes that x is red. 
Schroeder suggests this principle. He writes, for example, that a ‘sentence means that 
p because that is the belief that it is only correct to assert the sentence if you have’ 
(2008: 109). And, at one point, McGinn says that correct use in the relevant sense is a 
matter of ‘which word is linguistically appropriate to the facts’. To illustrate, he offers 
the following example:  
Suppose I truly believe that this object is red; the question of linguistic correctness is 
then which word expresses this belief: is ‘red’ the word I ought to use to state the fact 
in which I believe? (1984: 60)  
A generalised version of (ACCORD4) would certainly deliver verdicts concerning the 
cases involving ‘vixen’ above which diverge from those which (OUGHT) and the like 
deliver. Moreover, since it makes no reference to intentions, whatever normativity 
(ACCORD4) concerns, it would appear not to be instrumental. This is looking 
promising. 
 
5  In defence of orthodoxy  
In the remainder, I shall challenge this unorthodox account of the normativity of 
meaning. In the first instance, I shall argue that reflection on the kinds of cases 
outlined in §3 does not support the rejection of (OUGHT) and the like in favour of 
(ACCORD4). To do so, I shall develop a familiar analogy in the service of an 
unfamiliar point.  
According to what one might call the orthodox view of chess, moves in the 
game are governed by rules, including one which states that one should not move a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
15 As noted above (n5), there might also be norms governing how a word is to be used in, say, inference. 
But such norms would be additional to, rather than an alternative to, the sort expressed by (CORRECT)   18 
piece diagonally if it is a rook. Suppose that Harry is playing chess. Due to some dust 
in his eye, Harry mistakes a rook for a bishop and moves the piece diagonally. Now 
suppose that Holly is playing chess. Holly moves a rook horizontally having mistaken 
it for a bishop. 
  Harry’s and Holly’s situation are analogous in the relevant respects to Bekki’s 
and Mike’s. But presumably one should not arrive, by parity of reasoning, at an 
unorthodox view of chess, according to which the use of a rook is actually governed 
by a rule according to which one should not move a piece diagonally if one believes 
that it is a rook. That would certainly conflict with what the rule book says!
16 
  Surely the thing to say is that Harry violates the chess rule and Holly does not. 
Since Harry’s violation is due to a mistaken belief, a factual error, one might say that 
it is blameless or reasonable (assuming his error in belief was blameless or 
reasonable). In contrast, though Holly conformed to the rule of chess, she might be 
criticisable, given that she believes the piece to be a bishop. That said, the case of 
Holly is underdescribed. Perhaps she believes (wrongly but reasonably) that, 
according to the rules of chess, one may move a bishop horizontally. In that case, her 
move might be blameless or reasonable. 
  What this shows is that numerous mistakes or error might be involved in rule-
governed activities like chess. First, one might violate the relevant norm, e.g. by 
moving a bishop horizontally. Second, one might make a mistaken factual judgement 
about the world, e.g. that a certain piece is a rook. Third, one might make a factual 
mistake about what the norm is or what it requires, e.g. that one may move a bishop 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and its variants. 
16 According to the handbook of the World Chess Federation, the following is a ‘law of chess’: the rook 
may move to any square along the file or the rank on which it stands. The rule is not: what one believes 
to be the rook may move to any square along the file or the rank on which it stands. See: 
http://www.fide.com/component/handbook/?id=124&view=article [accessed 14/03/2013].    19 
horizontally. In some cases, the first kind of mistake might be the result of one of the 
other kinds.  
  All of this is consistent with, indeed vindicates, the orthodox view of chess. 
The only relevant rule of chess in the cases that concern us is: one should not move a 
piece diagonally if it is a rook. Failure to accord with this rule might be due to a 
mistaken belief about what the rule is, or about whether it applies in a given instance. 
Of course, belief itself might be governed by a norm which delivers the verdict that a 
mistake has been made—perhaps a norm according to which one may believe that p 
only if p—but this is clearly not a norm of chess. 
Returning in light of all of this to cases like those involving Mike and Bekki, 
parity of reasoning suggests the following. Numerous mistakes or error might be 
involved in the norm-governed use of language. First, one might violate the relevant 
norm, e.g. by applying ‘vixen’ to a male cat. Second, one might make a mistaken 
factual judgement about the world, e.g. that something is a female fox. Third, one 
might make a factual mistake about what the norm is or what it requires, e.g. that one 
may apply ‘vixen’ to a male cat. In some cases, the first kind of mistake might be the 
result of one of the other kinds.  
  All of this is consistent with, indeed vindicates, orthodox Normativism. The 
only relevant rule in the cases that concern us is: one should not apply ‘vixen’ to 
something unless it is a female fox. Failure to accord with this rule might be due to a 
mistaken belief about what the rule is, or about whether it applies in a given instance. 
Of course, such belief might be governed by a norm by reference to which one judges 
that a mistake has been made—perhaps a norm according to which one may believe 
that p only if p—but this is clearly not a norm of language. So, reflection on the cases 
above does not give us reason to reject orthodox Normativism.   20 
 
6  The defence continued 
In this section, I shall make some additional points in support of orthodoxy regarding 
the normativity of meaning and in criticism of the unorthodox view under 
consideration.  
It is common for those rejecting orthodoxy to appeal to the thought that a 
subject who misapplies an expression, and hence asserts a falsehood, is not making a 
semantic mistake but a mistake about the world or the language-independent facts 
(see, e.g., Schroeder 2008: 108-109). That is right. But it does not follow that such a 
speaker is not thereby violating a semantic norm. 
It is natural to think that, just as a geographical, historical, or mathematical 
mistake is a mistake about some geographical, historical, or mathematical matter, a 
semantic mistake is a mistake about semantics, that is, a mistake about what a word 
means (or about the norms governing its use). As we have seen, such a mistake is a 
species of factual mistake, involving a mistaken belief or judgement, and might 
explain why a subject violates a semantic norm. In a parallel fashion, a mistake about 
the rules of chess is a species of factual mistake, involving a mistaken belief or 
judgement, and might explain why a subject violates a rule of chess. Whether a 
subject makes a semantic mistake and whether she accords with a semantic rule look 
like two separate matters. 
One might wonder why, if failure to accord with a semantic norm need not 
involve or amount to a semantic mistake, we nonetheless describe the norm as 
semantic (as opposed to, say, assertoric or alethic). The (orthodox) Normativist 
answer is that the fact that the relevant norm governs the use of the expression is   21 
essential to its meaning what it does, that is, to its having the semantic properties that 
it does; it is because of this connection that the norm counts a semantic. 
These points in turn cast doubt on the common suggestion that a violation of a 
semantic norm betokens a lack of understanding or inadequate grasp of the meaning 
of an expression (see, e.g., Glock 2005: 229). Since misapplying (=falsely) an 
expression need not betoken lack of understanding, this is supposed to show that 
misapplying an expression is not a violation of a semantic norm.  
It is certainly plausible to think that a semantic mistake evinces a poor 
understanding or grasp of an expression’s meaning. But, as we have just seen, 
whether a subject makes a semantic mistake is a different issue to whether she accords 
with a semantic norm. Compare: when someone moves a rook diagonally, does this 
betoken lack of understanding (of chess)? It may or may not do so, depending on 
whether the mistake was due to a mistaken judgement about what the rules require. 
Either way, the rules require her not to move a rook diagonally. 
 
7  A can of worms 
So far, I have argued that the case against orthodoxy is unsuccessful. In this 
penultimate section, I shall tentatively suggest that, even if the proponent of the 
orthodox interpretation of the slogan, ‘Meaning is normative’, is forced to accept 
(ACCORD4), she might account for it in a manner which is consistent with that 
interpretation. The remarks to follow introduce some somewhat controversial ideas 
which I cannot adequately defend here. Fortunately, the preceding arguments do not 
depend on them. 
It is common for philosophers not participating in the debate over the 
normativity of meaning to distinguish between what one objectively ought to do and   22 
what one subjectively ought to do (see Parfit 2010: ch. 1; Schroeder 2007; Way 2009). 
Very roughly, objective norms tell us what to do given the facts, while subjective 
norms tell us what to do given our beliefs about the facts.
17 Objective norms are basic 
or fundamental, on this view, while subjective norms are derived from and explained 
in terms of them, as follows. One subjectively ought to φ in a situation just in case, 
were one’s beliefs about the situation true, it would be the case that one objectively 
ought to φ. In this way, the objective norm is more basic in the order of explanation; 
what one subjectively ought to do is explained in terms of what one objectively ought 
to do in counterfactual circumstances (namely, those in which one’s  beliefs are true). 
  To appreciate the rationale for this distinction, suppose that the following 
holds: 
(PEANUT)   One ought not to give peanuts to a person if she has peanut 
allergies. 
Lucy believes that Charlie has no allergies and gives him a peanut, which results in 
anaphylaxis. According to (PEANUT), given that Charlie is in fact allergic to peanuts, 
Lucy has done what she ought not to do. But, given what she believes, her action 
seems reasonable and (so) not criticisable. Though Lucy has violated the objective 
norm (PEANUT), she satisfies the following subjective norm: 
(PEANUTS)  One ought not to give peanuts to a person if one believes that 
she has peanut allergies. 
More generally, whether an agent is to be evaluated positively or negative, as 
reasonable or otherwise, criticisable or not, is determined by whether she satisfies the 
subjective, not objective, norm. 
                                                           
17 One might want to add that those beliefs must be rational or reasonable beliefs about the facts. For 
the remainder, I shall take this constraint as given.   23 
One might ask why we positively evaluate a subject doing what she 
subjectively should do, when, in doing so, she does what she objectively should not 
do. But the question seems to go a long way to answering itself—the subject is doing 
what, from her perspective, she should do, which is presumably all we can ask from 
finite creatures like ourselves. No doubt a fuller answer could be given but this 
suffices for present purposes.  
  In light of this, the orthodox Normativist might accept (ACCORD4), so long as 
the ‘may’ in question is understood as subjective. The norm is derived from or 
generated in a familiar fashion by the objective (MAY) or its equivalents. 
Armed with this framework, orthodox Normativists can say the following. 
While Bekki, in applying ‘vixen’ to a male cat which she believes to be a female fox, 
does what she objectively ought not to do, she is nonetheless doing what she 
subjectively may do. While Mike, in applying ‘vixen’ to a female fox which he 
believes to be a male cat, does what he objectively may do, he is nonetheless doing 
what he subjectively ought not to do. Thus, Mike’s use of the term is criticisable or 
unreasonable in a way in which Bekki’s is not.
18 So, to accommodate the examples, 
the proponent of the orthodox reading needs only to distinguish the objective norm 
governing the use of ‘vixen’ and the subjective norm—where the latter is explained in 
terms of the former. She does not need to introduce a species of normativity distinct 
from that which (MAY) and the like express. 
   This distinction between objective norms and subjective norms raises thorny 
issues, for example, concerning how to understand the verdicts the subjective norm 
delivers, especially where they seem to diverge from those the objective norm 
delivers. It is clearly beyond the scope of this paper to resolve these issues. My aim   24 
here is only to point out that, by appeal to a framework introduced and motivated 
independently of the issues which concern us, a proponent of the orthodox 
interpretation might be able, not only to accommodate (ACCORD4), but to explain it. If 
this proves correct, it counts in favour of orthodoxy—presumably one should not 
multiply norms beyond necessity. 
 
8  Conclusion 
In this paper, I considered an objection to the orthodox reading of the slogan 
‘Meaning is normative’, according to which facts about correct application follow 
from facts about meaning. According to the objection, the slogan, so interpreted, 
conflates semantic correctness with factual correctness. One might respond to this by 
presenting the semantically correct use of an expression as distinct and potentially 
divergent from its correct application in assertion. This response, I argued, is 
unsuccessful, in part because the alternative understanding of the slogan proved 
elusive. In its place, I pointed to ways in which the advocate of the slogan might deal 
with the objection while holding on to the standard interpretation. Perhaps there are 
other problems facing the slogan, so interpreted, but for now, it seems, one can 
continue to maintain the status quo. 
  I have defended the view that the norms of meaning and the norms governing 
assertion are, so to speak, two sides of one coin. This suggests that one might make 
progress in the debates concerning the normativity of meaning, which often seem 
intractable, by considering the relationship between the fact that an expression bears a 
certain meaning and the fact that it can be used to perform a certain sort of speech act. 
Exploring this connection is the task for another occasion. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
18 Of course, the cases are underdescribed. If Mike, for example, is using the term as he does having   25 
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